Professors at Patrick Henry College sign a statement of faith as a requirement of employment. This practice might suggest to some that our professors give up academic freedom when they sign the PHC statement of faith. The unstated assumption embedded in such a claim is that academic freedom is an intrinsically good thing and policies that compromise this freedom are undesirable. Fair enough. Most people agree that academic freedom is good. But this only raises an obvious question, namely, what exactly is academic freedom?
At first blush, academic freedom would appear to mean the freedom of those holding academic posts to conduct research and teach the subject of their expertise in whatever way they see fit. The imposition of any guidelines that restrict the freedom of the scholar are undesirable, for restrictions serve to stifle creativity and silence challenges to the current orthodoxy, challenges that, as we have seen throughout history, ought to be heard. If this is what academic freedom means, then religious colleges that require faculty to sign faith statements do indeed appear to limit academic freedom.
But perhaps academic freedom should be understood in another sense. What if we define academic freedom as the freedom for scholars holding similar worldviews to associate and in so doing to form a community of scholars actively pursuing truth in a collegial and cooperative fashion? Academic freedom in this sense seeks to step back from the radically individualized conception in the first definition in favor of a view that emphasizes community and cooperation.
Before this communal notion of academic freedom is dismissed as stultifying or even (gasp) medieval, let's consider for a moment how scholars work. Anyone who has spent any time in a traditional academic department (especially liberal arts and social science departments) knows that one doesn't have to scratch very deep to find substantial and often bitter divisions. Alliances naturally form and at times acrimony grows between opposing factions. Those scholars who share similar worldviews tend to gravitate toward each other. They voluntarily choose to associate on a deeper and more meaningful level than with those in the department with whom they fundamentally disagree. They read each other's papers, collaborate on articles, and informally discuss ideas. In short, they form sub-communities within the larger, and sometimes dysfunctional, academic department.
Such associations are not limited to academic departments, though. The same sort of self-segregation often occurs at professional meetings. Those with similar views naturally tend to gravitate toward each other as they form panels and discuss papers and books that interest them precisely because they share similar conceptions of the world.
In other words, regardless of whether or not scholars sign statements of faith, they tend to form voluntary associations with like-minded colleagues. The obvious corollary to this reality is that some people are excluded from some groups. But, far from being onerous, this exclusion is usually mutually agreeable. Would a politically left-leaning feminist seek to be a contributing member of a community of conservative Thomists? Or vice versa? This is not to suggest that there is no place for constructive engagement between communities, but such engagement comes after an idea has been developed and tested within a community committed to working within a particular conceptual framework.
Creative scholarship is hindered where scholars must constantly defend the basic first principles upon which their conception of the world is grounded. As such, a community of scholars sharing a similar worldview will be able to pour their energies into their scholarship without constantly having to justify their very intellectual existence. This environment of cooperation and collegiality (which does not imply lack of either debate or disagreement) is precisely the type of environment best suited to the germination and nurturing of new ideas. Since scholars naturally form these sorts of communities regardless of whether or not they are employed at institutions that require faculty to adhere to a particular set of beliefs, academic freedom understood in the communal sense seems more in keeping with real practices than the radically individualistic notion that is currently held up as the ideal. If this is the case, then institutions that require their faculty to sign statements of faith are merely formalizing a type of voluntary relationship that almost always arises naturally at institutions where no such requirement exists. As such, statements of faith do not in themselves limit true academic freedom.
